


MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Bowie

Bob-

I thought that the staff session on Jan 4th was a worthwhile one - it would probably be profitable to hold one periodically.

The session brought out a broad range of regional and topical subjects, most of which struck one as pertinent. I have attached some rough thoughts, some already brought out on Jan 4th; they are suggestive only and have not been fleshed out.



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NFAC 0079-79

5 January 1979

NOTE FOR DR. BOWIE

SUBJECT: Major Problems/Issues Emerging In 1979-80

✓ 1. Strategic Nuclear Forces Balance

a. On the assumption that there will be a SALT II agreement, the more obvious issues will involve verification, Backfire as a strategic bomber, the vulnerability of Minute Man, and the limitations placed on cruise missiles. Defense of the United States, in terms of civil defense, air defense against air-breathing vehicles such as the Backfire, and the state of ABM technology (US vs. USSR), may also become an issue. An international debate, as well as an American debate, will no doubt ensue. NATO and other US allies will debate the question of who is perceived as #1 (US or USSR?) and the implications for their own security. NATO allies will be particularly concerned about any US-USSR agreed "statement of principles" with respect to SALT III negotiations, as well as US/NATO objectives for SALT III.

b. If one "thinks the unthinkable", the implications of the US Senate's rejection of a US-USSR governmental agreement, or US Senate demands for modifications before ratification, should be considered. What would be Soviet reactions? How badly does the Soviet Union want SALT II? International reactions? Impact on US presidency and US policies, plans and programs?

2. The staff meeting of 4 January seemed to cover the field pretty well. However, these thoughts come to mind.

✓ a. Is the Pacific Basin overtaking the NATO Basin as "#1 priority" from the point of view of US interests? Implications?

× b. The Western Hemisphere and Caribbean areas are generally conceded to be of fundamental importance to the United States? Is US influence waning in Latin America? How is the US perceived in key countries such as Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela, for example? Is the US losing out (in political and economic terms) to other foreign influence?

✓ c. The Middle East, another obviously key area of US-USSR rivalry:

- Has the situation in Iran hurt the spirit of Camp David? What are the chances of an Egypt-Israel peace treaty now? If such a treaty is delayed indefinitely, what will be the impact on Egypt? Can Sadat survive very long?

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SUBJECT: Major Problems/Issue. Emerging In 1979-80

- Are the Arab moderates losing ground viz-a-viz the radical Arab States? In light of the Iran situation and Soviet-Cuban successes in the Horn of Africa, is Saudi Arabia having second thoughts about its relations with the US?

- What are the implications of such developments for Israel?

X d. The "Northern Tier" in the Near East: Turkey-Iran-Afghanistan-Pakistan.

- Taken as a whole, what is the outlook for this area? Are we in for some rude surprises in 1979?

✓ e. Southern Africa:

✓ - The Rhodesian question will probably reach a climax in 1979. Will the white departure from Rhodesia continue to accelerate? At what point will it tip the balance against the present regime? How long can the present government survive if some political settlement is not reached? If the government and its security forces start to unravel, what are the most likely outcomes?


- If there is a collapse in Rhodesia, gradual or sudden, what is the likely impact on the rest of Southern Africa, especially the Republic of South Africa?

- What are the chances for a successful UN mission in Namibia? What is the likely outcome in Namibia? How dependent is it on the outcome in Rhodesia?

- What are the overall implications for the US of a ZANU-ZAPU victory in Rhodesia?

3. The above points are mine alone and have not been considered by the Review Panel as a group.

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